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I. INTRODUCTION
During Fiscal Year 1999, which began October 1, 1998 and
ended September 30, 1999, the U.S. Coast Guard seized a record
111,689 pounds of cocaine.1 Even more remarkable than the total
amount, was that over 2,000 pounds of that total were seized
using a new interdiction method for the Coast Guard: the use of
force from helicopters to stop fleeing vessels who refuse to do so
upon a valid order of the United States.2 As the primary U.S.
agency for maritime law enforcement on the high seas, the Coast
Guard has historically employed force from Coast Guard cutters
when necessary to compel compliance with a lawful order,
including warning shots and disabling fire directed at suspect
vessels.3 However, until recently, Coast Guard policy prohibited
helicopters and aircrafts from using any force for the purpose of
law enforcement, although permitting the use of force in self-
defense.4
1. U.S. Coast Guard, Drug Seizure Record 62 Tons of Cocaine Seized by Coast
Guard This Year (Sept. 28, 2000), available at
httu://www.uscg.mil/news/drugs2000/index.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2000). This total
easily surpassed the records set in Fiscal Year 1997 and Fiscal Year 1991 of 103,617
pounds and 90,335 pounds respectively. Seizure data referring to the number of pounds
seized is based on drug seizures in which the Coast Guard was a primary participant as
reported in the Federal Drug Seizure System, which is managed by the El Paso
Information Center.
2. Stout, David, Coast Guard Using Sharpshooters to Stop Boats, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 1999, at A18.
3. Warning shots and disabling fire were used extensively by the Coast Guard to
enforce the Prohibition Law during the 1920's against vessels attempting to smuggle
alcohol into the United States. See e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1924)
(warning shots); United States v. 63 Kegs of Malt, 27 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1928) (warning
shots); The Vinces, 20 F.2d 164 (E.D.S.C. 1927), affd, Gillam v. United States, 27 F.2d
(4th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 635 (1928) (warning shots and disabling fire). See
also Donald L. Canney, Rum War: The U.S. Coast Guard and Prohibition, available at
http://www.uscg.millhq/g-cp/historv/h rumwar.html (last modified June 2000).
4. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Manual COMDTINST M16247.1A
[hereinafter MLEM] (unpublished, on file with author), at 4-3. The Coast Guard
Historian's office believes that prior to the deployment of this new capability in 1999, the
last time the Coast Guard authorized any use of force from an aircraft to disable vessels
was in the 1920's when fixed-wing aircrafts were used to chase down and stop shipments
of illegal alcohol. David Briscoe, Coast Guard Using Sharpshooters to Knock Out Drug
Boats (Sept. 14, 1999), available at
http://www.caller.com/1999/september/14/today/nationavl785.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2000).
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Under the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), the
Coast Guard has been designated as lead federal agency for
maritime drug interdiction in the transit zone, the maritime area
between source countries where drugs are produced and the
arrival zone off the coast of the United States.5 The core of the
Coast Guard's drug interdiction strategy is the denial of
maritime routes to smugglers. Maritime route denial is
accomplished through law enforcement presence and interdiction
activities that effectively deter and disrupt the smuggler's use of
particular maritime routes. Disrupting drug traffickers forces
them to develop new, more costly methods and routes, and can
open them to additional risks. This is accomplished through
drug seizure, disruption of trafficking operations, and route
displacement. The pressure of these operations can reduce the
flow of illicit drugs into the United States via maritime routes.'
While the mere presence of Coast Guard cutters and other
assets patrolling at sea have some deterrent effect on smugglers,
the best deterrent against illegal activity is penalizing those
involved in the activity, including the arrest and prosecution of
individuals and the seizure of vessels and contraband.
Individuals are inhibited from conducting illicit activity when the
perceived risk of apprehension and its negative consequences
exceed the perceived benefits derived from the activity. Thus,
deterrence is achieved when the perceived benefits of compliance
outweigh the perceived benefits of illicit activity. Accordingly,
making sufficient contact with actual or potential violators
5. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy 2000,
Annual Report [hereinafter NDCS], available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicv.gov/policy ndc500/index.html (last modified Sept. 29,
2000).
6. U.S. Coast Guard, Counterdrug Strategic Plan 1998, Steel Web [hereinafter
CDSPI, at 9. The Coast Guard's strategy was designed to support NDCS Goal 4, "which is
to shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat" and NDCS Goal 5,
which is to "break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply." See Office of National
Drug Control Policy, NDCS, Strategic Goals and Objectives available at
httpJ/ea.usa.or.th/mirror/usinfo.state.vovroductshubs/druafact/ondco.htm (last visited
Oct. 29, 2000). The Coast Guard's goal is also in line with a statement which reaffirmed
the basic elements of established U.S. drug policy issued by the press secretary and
approved by President Clinton in November, 1993. Statement by the Press Secretary on
Drug Control Policy, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2253 (Nov. 3, 1993), available at
http://www.fas.orgirp/offdocs/pddl4.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2000)(stating that illegal
narcotics are severely damaging to American society and a serious threat to national
security and outlining a policy whereby the United States would provide assistance to
those governments that demonstrate the political will to act against illicit cocaine
production, trafficking, and abuse).
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through presence of law enforcement assets and boardings of
suspect vessels produces deterrence. A 1989 study sponsored by
federal law enforcement agencies proposed a qualitative
relationship between smuggler perceptions of the probability that
they will be interdicted and the percentage of smugglers
deterred.7 Interdiction rates are the rates at which vessels
suspected of smuggling drugs are stopped and boarded by law
enforcement authorities as a percentage of the total estimated
number of vessels engaged in drug smuggling. Using interdiction
rates as a proxy for the probability of actual interdiction
indicates that a 40% probability of interdiction yields an 80%
deterrent factor.' In other words, interdiction of 40% of the
estimated vessels engaged in maritime drug smuggling deters
80% of the potential smuggling vessels from engaging in the
maritime movement of drugs.
However, in order for Coast Guard efforts to achieve the
desired results against drug smugglers, the Coast Guard must
have the practical ability to board suspect vessels any time they
have the legal authority to do so; a task that sounds simple, but
can be difficult and dangerous when a suspect refuses to comply
with a lawful order of the Coast Guard. Recent changes in
tactics by maritime drug smugglers have rendered ineffective the
Coast Guard's traditional methods of stopping uncooperative
vessels.' The ineffectiveness of the Coast Guard's traditional
methods is particularly acute since the rapid rise in the use of
fast, maneuverable "Go-Fast" vessels by drug smugglers. As a
result, the Coast Guard decided that new capabilities and tactics
were needed to regain a credible, maritime law enforcement
presence.
This paper outlines the development of the Coast Guard's
airborne use of force capability and doctrine from the legal
perspective. Part I provides a general overview of the need for
7. CDSP, supra note 6, at 10. The study was commissioned by the Interdiction
Committee (TIC) and conducted by Rockwell, International, Special Investigations Inc.
Follow up studies needed for confirmation have been delayed due to funding concerns, but
are scheduled to occur in the next few years. Founded in 1987, TIC is a multi-agency
body of Federal agency leaders chartered by the ONDCP to discuss and resolve issues
relating to the coordination, oversight and integration of international border and
domestic interdiction efforts in support of the NDCS.
8. CDSP, supra note 6, at app. D2-3.
9. See Mike Emerson, Coast Guard Helos: A Call to Arms, 125/1011,160
PROCEEDINGS 30 (1999).
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the Coast Guard's development of the capability to use force from
the air to counter the recent change in tactics by drug smugglers.
Part II focuses on the legal regime of the United States
underlying the Coast Guard's use of force, examining the
statutory and constitutional basis for the use of force in law
enforcement. This part also explores the development of the
Coast Guard's continuum of force, which is designed to provide a
wide range of options suitable for use in a variety of situations
and enhance the Coast Guard's use of the minimum force
necessary. Part III then examines the international law basis for
this new capability, focusing on the use of force against
apparently stateless vessels on the high seas. This part argues
that even though the standard for the use of force in a law
enforcement context is not well-defined under international law,
the implied right to use force in such instances is crucial to
ensuring the continued viability of the international law of the
sea regime.
II. PART I: NEW THREATS LEAD TO NEW SOLUTIONS: THE
RISE OF THE GO-FAST
The history of maritime law enforcement by the Coast Guard
dates back to 1790 when its predecessor, the Revenue Marine,
later renamed the Revenue Cutter Service was established to
combat the smuggling of goods into the newly established United
States.' ° Initially, this protection involved the control of post-
Revolution commercial smuggling and enforcement of customs
laws. Later in the nineteenth century, interdicting slave traders
became a mandated mission. From 1920 to 1933, the Coast
Guard interdicted alcohol smugglers in support of the Volstead
Act and the Prohibition Law." During the 1970's, illegal drug
smuggling of marijuana through the Caribbean and the Bahamas
emerged as a significant threat, and the Coast Guard employed a
"choke point" strategy to deny drug smugglers the easiest routes
to the United States. As the drug smuggling threat grew, Coast
Guard and other federal agency resources matched the threat
with increased resources targeted at smugglers. Since the early
1970's, a substantial portion of the Coast Guard's maritime law





enforcement mission has been the interdiction of vessels
attempting to smuggle drugs.
12
In the late 1990's, Coast Guard enforcement activities in the
Caribbean succeeded in hampering the efforts of drug smugglers
since at that time drug smugglers used slow moving coastal
freighters and fishing vessels. Faced with the loss of hundreds of
millions of dollars in illicit cargoes, the smugglers shifted
transportation modes to high-speed Go-Fast vessels, also called
"cigarette boats." These vessels are specifically designed to make
a quick transit across the Caribbean and are capable of carrying
up to a ton of cocaine. 3 Go-Fast vessels are typically equipped
with powerful engines, a skeletal crew, and several extra fuel
barrels to ensure sufficient fuel for the transit. 14 Go-Fast vessels
are extremely frustrating for law enforcement throughout the
region since they are difficult to detect and even harder to stop,
traditionally outrunning law enforcement vessel platforms.15
The difficulties encountered by law enforcement personnel
have made the Go-Fast a preferred method for drug smugglers.
Law enforcement officials estimate that between July 1998 and
July 1999, drug smugglers completed 400 Go-Fast transits; U.S.
law enforcement vessels pursued between fifty and sixty transits,
actually boarding only sixteen of the Go-Fast vessels.16 The
remaining suspects evaded apprehension because U.S. surface
interdiction forces were generally unable to get close enough to
the suspect vessels to compel them to stop. Even more alarming
is the tenfold increase in Go-Fast activity in the last five years."
Currently, Go-Fasts account for over half the cocaine flow to the
United States. 8 The Institute for Defense Analysis predicts that
this rapid increase in the use of Go-Fasts to smuggle drugs will
continue unabated until the smugglers see a visible deterrent,
either through higher arrest rates of smugglers, unacceptably
12. U.S. Coast Guard, Maritime Law Enforcement History, available at
http://www.uscg.mil/ha/g-o/-opl/mle/progov2.htm (last modified May 5, 2000).
13. Emerson, supra note 9.
14. Id.
15. See Robert B. Watts, Gotta Get the Go-Fasts (Sept. 1999), available at
http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/PROwatts.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2000), for a
discussion of the difficulty of interdicting Go-Fasts.
16. David Abel, Despite New Resolve, U.S. Lacks Firepower in Drug War, DEFENSE
WEEK, Sept. 20, 1999, at 1.
17. Emerson, supra note 9.
18. NDCS, supra note 5, at 79.
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high losses of cargo resulting from seizures, or having to jettison
narcotics to avoid law enforcement activity.19
The potential consequences of failing to stop drug smugglers
are serious. Drug smuggling is a unique business that does not
follow the traditional laws of supply and demand. In the world of
illegal drugs, supply can drive demand, and a plentiful supply
can actually create a demand. An instructive example of this
theory can be found in the Caribbean island nations. For many
years these nations saw illegal drugs as a scourge affecting only
the United States, the origin of demand, until traffickers started
paying island smugglers with cocaine.2" No longer serving as just
a transshipment point for smugglers, the introduction of cheap
cocaine within these countries created demand problems where
before none had existed. Caribbean governments now see illegal
narcotics as one of their greatest challenges. The West Indian
Commission, tasked to consider the future of the Caribbean,
stated in its 1992 Report:
Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in
CARICOM countries than the drugs problem. The
damage.. .to democratic society itself from the drug
problem is as great a menace as any dictator's
repression.. .CARICOM countries are threatened today
by an onslaught from illegal drugs as crushing as any
21military repression.
The Prime Minister of Jamaica underscored this concern in a
1997 speech to the Caribbean Community and Common Market
emphasizing that "[w]e cannot allow the drug cartels.. .operating
in or across our borders to threaten our democratic institutions to
pervert our system of justice and destroy the health and well-
being of our citizens, young or old."22 The problems associated
with drug smuggling are not limited to the Caribbean region. In
1997, there were about 780 homicides as a result of illegal
19. Emerson, supra note 9, at 32.
20. Conversation with CDR M. Emerson, Chief, Drug Interdiction Division, Office of
Law Enforcement, Coast Guard Headquarters (1998-2000), [hereinafter CG Drug
Interdiction Division]. This conversation took place during the development of the use of
force capability from helicopters.
21. EU Experts Group, 'The Caribbean and the Drugs Problem," April 1996, at 1.
22. The President's News Conference With Caribbean Leaders in Bridgetown, 33
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 699, 700 (May 10, 1997).
2000]
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drugs.23 The annual social cost of drug use is estimated at $110
billion - the consequence of drug related crime. 4
Knowing that a threat exists does not always result in the
ability to counter the threat successfully. In a substantial
number of instances where a suspect Go-Fast vessel was
detected, Coast Guard helicopters or helicopter-equipped vessels
were on the scene with the suspect or were within flying range,
even though no surface asset could intercept the suspect.
However, because of the Coast Guard's policy barring helicopters
from using force, there was no practical way to compel a non-
cooperative suspect to stop and allow the Coast Guard to board.
As a result, Coast Guard helicopters could do nothing more than
report what they observed before returning empty-handed.
By the Spring of 1998, the Coast Guard realized that the
only way to effectively counter the rapid rise in drug smugglers'
use of faster and more maneuverable Go-Fast vessels was to
develop the capability to stop suspect vessels from the air.26
Doubts about whether it was possible to train crews to employ
force safely from a helicopter without rising to the level of deadly
force were put to rest by the fact that during 1998, both Colombia
and Panama successfully and safely used warning shots from
helicopters to stop over a dozen suspect Go-Fasts. 7 In August
1999, after much discussion and debate within the Coast Guard,
the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral James Loy,
authorized the development of the capability for airborne use of
force from helicopters. Admiral Loy explained his rationale for
23. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Drugs and Crime Facts, available at
http://www.oip.usdoj.gov/bis/dcf/contents.htm (last modified June 21, 2000).
24. Id.
25. CG Drug Interdiction Division, supra note 20. One factor compounding the
Coast Guard's inability to intercept suspects in a timely manner is the traffickers'
willingness to exploit territorial boundaries. Although the Coast Guard has the authority
to conduct Right of Visit boardings, as discussed infra, this same right does not exist in
the territorial waters of other countries where the coastal state has primary jurisdiction.
A smuggling vessel could travel through fourteen national jurisdictions on a voyage
between Colombia and the U.S. Virgin Islands, easily frustrating the efforts of law
enforcement personnel to maintain contact with it throughout its illicit journey. While
traffickers move with impunity between national jurisdictions, foreign law enforcement
units may not do so without prior approval of the territorial sovereign.
26. See Emerson, supra note 9, for a discussion of policy issues facing the Coast
Guard as part of this decision. As with any policy change, the decision was controversial,
especially among many within the Coast Guard's aviation community who expressed
safety concerns.
27. Id. at 31.
[Vol. 31:3
2000] AIRBORNE USE OF FORCE
this decision stating,
[fi or too long, we simply watched the narco-traffickers in
60-knot boats literally run away from us after excellent
work had already been done to find them. .. For those
narco-traffickers who continue to use international
waters to deliver their deadly cargoes: we will continue
to use every tool in our arsenal to stop you.28
The Commandant's decision was made with the clear
understanding that safety was paramount and that the
capability would be used only in conformance with a well-
developed doctrine, following extensive evaluations, testing, and
training."
III. PART II: DOMESTIC AUTHORITY FOR COAST GUARD
AIRBORNE USE OF FORCE
One crucial aspect of the development of the capability to use
force from helicopters for law enforcement was ensuring full
compliance with U.S. and international law. 0 The Coast Guard's
28. Dave French, America's Deadliest Imports (Nov. 10, 1999), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/h/-cp/cb/NOV99/Drurs.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2000).
29. Internal Coast Guard Memorandum from Admiral Loy, Commandant of the
Coast Guard, to Rear Admiral Ruitta, Assistant Commandant for Operations (Sept. 1,
1998)(unpublished memorandum, on file with author). This memorandum approved the
use of warning shots and disabling fire from helicopters for development and initial
fielding of the capability. The memo required the development of an implementing
doctrine and training protocol.
30. The use of force to compel compliance with legitimate law enforcement
authority, whether the jurisdictional basis is that of a flag State, coastal State, or by any
other means, should not be confused with force used in a military context. The goal of law
enforcement is just that, the enforcement of an applicable law. The use of force as part of
a law enforcement scenario is merely a means to an end; force is used to achieve the goal
of enforcing a law. However, the use of force in a military context is used to accomplish a
military objective, not the enforcement of an applicable law. This distinction is key since
the use of force as part of a legitimate law enforcement activity is not the type of force
contemplated by the various "peace-related" articles in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 88, opened
for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter LOS Convention] (the reservation
of the high seas for "peaceful purposes"); LOS Convention, art. 301 (requiring that states
refrain from the use of force "in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations"). The United States
has not ratified the LOS Convention, but has stated its intent to abide by the vast
majority of the Convention and treat it as customary international law. President's
Statement on United States Ocean Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 383 (Mar.
10, 1983). Limitations on the use of force in a military context, also termed the law of
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use of force policy regarding the employment of force from Coast
Guard vessels has been carefully developed through the years to
ensure compliance within a constitutional and statutory
framework, as well as abiding by international law principles.
Thus, there was a solid legal framework to build upon when
developing the capability to use force from helicopters.
A. U.S. Law Regarding the Use of Force in Law
Enforcement
Domestic, statutory law clearly authorizes the Coast Guard
to use force, if necessary, for law enforcement purposes."1 The
Coast Guard is authorized to "use all necessary force to compel
compliance" in making "inquiries, examinations, inspections,
searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters
over which the United States has jurisdiction for the prevention,
detection, and suppression of the violations of the laws of the
United States.""
The Coast Guard's policy for use of force is based on the
premise of minimum force necessary.33 Personnel are trained to
view the use of force as a continuum, escalating from low-levels
of force, such as officer presence and verbal commands, to higher
levels depending on the circumstances. The highest end of the
continuum, minus deadly force, is the use of warning shots and
disabling fire against a vessel. Warning shots, which the Coast
armed conflict, seek to prevent purposeless, unnecessary destruction of life and property
and to ensure violence and are used only to defeat the enemy's military forces. See
Thomas & Duncan, Annotation, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations, 73 INTL LAW STUDIES 289, 289-321 (1999) [hereinafter Commander's
Handbook], for a discussion of the principles underlying the law of armed conflict. See
also R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 307-314 (3d. ed. 1988),
for a discussion regarding the use of force associated with military use of the high seas.
31. 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1990).
32. Id. at § 89(a) (emphasis added). Generally, in the case of vessels suspected of
transporting narcotics, the underlying U.S. law being enforced is the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1903-1904 (1994). However, the constitutionality of the
Coast Guard's ability to conduct boardings in both U.S. waters and on the high seas and
to conduct a document check even when there is no suspicion of a violation of law is well
established. See e.g., Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927)(upholding Coast Guard
boarding of U.S. vessel outside 12 miles); United States v. Villamonte-Marques, 462 U.S.
579 (1983)(evidence obtained by a Coast Guard boarding to check a vessel's
documentation under authority of 19 U.S.C. § 1581, when the Coast Guard acts as a
customs agent is not excludable since the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
33. MLEM, supra note 4, at 4-2.
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Guard considers to be a signal and not a use of force, consist of
firing shots from a weapon in front of a vessel as a signal to
immediately stop, maneuver in a particular manner, or cease
activity.34 Disabling fire is the firing of a weapon at a vessel and
not at people with the intent to disable the vessel, with minimum
injury to personnel or damage to the vessel.' The use of weapons
in this context is specifically authorized by statutory law, which
permits a Coast Guard vessel or aircraft to "fire at or into" a
vessel that does not stop after warning shots have been used."6
Being authorized by statute to use force is not the only
standard that must be met. The proposed use of force must also
adhere to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. 7 In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court
34. Id. at 4-4.
35. Id.
36. 14 U.S.C. § 637 (1990), provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) Whenever any vessel liable to seizure or examination does not stop on being ordered
to do so or on being pursued by an authorized vessel or authorized aircraft which has
displayed the ensign, pennant, or other identifying insignia prescribed for an authorized
vessel or authorized aircraft, the person in command or in charge of the authorized vessel
or authorized aircraft may, after a gun has been fired by the authorized vessel or
authorized aircraft as a warning signal, fire at or into the vessel which does not stop.
...... (c) A vessel or aircraft is an authorized vessel or authorized aircraft for the
purposes of this section if-
(1) it is a Coast Guard vessel or aircraft . 2
It should be noted that as a matter of policy, most U.S. federal law enforcement entities,
including the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and the Department of
Transportation prohibit the use of warning shots or disabling fire against moving
vehicles. However, the Department of Treasury allows Customs agents to use warning
shots against vessels on the open waters, and the Department of Transportation policy
specifically allows the use of warning shots and disabling fire by the Coast Guard. Dep't of
Justice, Resolution 14 (Oct. 16, 1995) (DOJ Policy); Treas. Dep't Order No. 105-12, 60 FR
54569 (Oct. 24, 1995); Transp. Dep't Order 1660.2A (Oct. 14, 1997). The use of warning
shots and disabling fire against a vessel on the open water with a low likelihood of
potentially injuring bystanders is quite different than the use of warning shots or
disabling fire against a fast moving vehicle in a potentially crowded street environment.
Coast Guard policy recognizes the need to minimize risk to persons and does not
authorize the use of warning shots or disabling fire when there is a significant possibility
of injury to a person. MLEM, supra note 4, at 4-4.
37. It is arguable whether the constitutional standards under the Fourth
Amendment for search and seizure actually apply to non-U.S. citizens aboard vessels not
registered in the United States and located outside of U.S. waters. See United States v.
Verdugo Urquidez, 505 U.S. 1201 (1992), remanded to United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991). However, at least as a matter of policy, the
Coast Guard conducts all of its law enforcement actions in conformance with the
requirements of the U.S. Constitution. Because Coast Guard officers rarely know
whether a U.S. citizen is on board any vessel encountered, they must as a practical matter
take a cautious approach.
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ruled that the use of deadly force to affect a seizure was subject
to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard.8" In its
opinion, the court stated that the use of deadly force to stop a
fleeing suspect was only reasonable to prevent an escape, when
the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a significant threat of death or physical injury to
the officer or others.89 In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court
reiterated that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
standard should be applied to any claim that a law enforcement
officer used excessive force during the course of an arrest,
investigatory stop, or any type of "seizure.' ° Thus, it is clear that
under a Fourth Amendment analysis, a Coast Guard officer
would not be authorized to use deadly force, force likely to cause
death, or serious bodily injury, solely to stop a vessel for the
purpose of a Coast Guard examination, except in the rare case
where the officer believed the suspect posed a significant risk to
that officer or others.
Courts have rarely questioned the appropriateness of the use
of warning shots and/or disabling fire to compel a subsequent
boarding. 1  In cases where a court has examined the
reasonableness of the force used, the Coast Guard's use of
warning shots and disabling fire has been found to meet Fourth
Amendment requirements. For example, in United States v. Del
Prado-Montero, the court examined the boarding and seizure of a
vessel, which stopped only after the Coast Guard employed both
warning shots and disabling fire and found that "the boarding
and the seizure [of the M/V Ranger] were not in conflict with
[U.S.] statutes, international treaties or conventions, or the
Constitution. ' In United States v. Streifel, the court upheld the
use of warning shots, which were fired to compel the MV
38. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Previously, the Supreme Court held that whenever a law
enforcement officer has stopped a person's ability to walk away, the action should be
analyzed as a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16
(1968).
39. See Tennessee, 471 U.S. at 7-12.
40. 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Potes, 880 F.2d 1475 (1st Cir. 1989Xwarning shots and
disabling fire); United States v. Kelly, 749 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 966 (1987)(use of warning shots and disabling fire); United States v. Dominguez, 604
F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, Sarmineto v. United States, 444 U.S. 1014
(1980)(warning shots); United States v. Munoz 16 F.3d 1116 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 852 (1994)(warning shots).
42. 740 F.2d 113, 115 (lst Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021 (1984).
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Roondiep to stop since firing warning shots was reasonable
within the Fourth Amendment and was the least drastic way to
force the ship to stop. 3
B. Developing a Continuum of Force for Use of Force
from Helicopters
The fundamental challenge facing the Coast Guard in
implementing the policy change allowing the use of force from
helicopters was determining that the employment of potentially
deadly weapons could be done safely in a non-lethal capacity.
Therefore, a critical element in developing the Coast Guard's new
airborne use of force capability was training and testing Coast
Guard personnel's ability to employ a weapon from a moving
helicopter in front of, or into the engine of, a moving vessel, in a
safe but effective manner. To determine whether Coast Guard
crews were able to safely employ force from the air, a variety of
tests, using both static and moving targets were conducted."
This phase of the development was derived from the vast
experiences of the Department of Defense personnel who use
weapons from the air. The resulting tactics developed by the
Coast Guard personnel were specifically tailored to the Coast
Guard's unique operating environment.
To augment helicopter crews' capability to stop suspect
vessels, the Coast Guard tested an array of other tools termed
"less intrusive means," also referred to as non-lethal
technologies, to provide on the scene Coast Guard officers with a
full continuum of force.45 Although these tools as designed are
43. 665 F.2d 414, 424 (2d Cir. 1981).
44. CG Drug Interdiction Division, supra note 20.
45. Id. This testing and evaluation relied heavily on the work of individuals at the
Coast Guard Research and Development Center and was greatly assisted by the
Department of Defense's Joint Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Program. While the Joint
NLW Program is focused on developing tools for use in a military context, the reasons for
the Department of Defense's focus on this emerging area of weapons technology, set forth
in the Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons, which was derived from Joint Vision 2010,
are equally as valid in a non-military, law enforcement context:
"Non-lethal weapons expand the number of options available to commanders confronting
situations in which the use of deadly force poses problems. They provide flexibility by
allowing U.S. forces to apply measured military force with reduced risk of serious
noncombatant casualties, but still in such a manner as to provide force protection and
effect compliance ....... This allows U.S. forces to retain the initiative and reduce their
own vulnerability. Thus, a robust non-lethal capability will assist in bringing into
balance the conflicting requirements of mission accomplishment, force protection, and
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unlikely to cause death or permanent physical injury, no one can
guarantee that they will be non-lethal one hundred percent of the
time." For this reason, the continuum of force was designed to
start at a low-level, such as verbal commands, using tools with
the least risk, and gradually increasing in level of force in order
to compel compliance. Available tools include nets to entangle
engines and small rubber balls, generally referred to as "sting
balls," originally designed to control riots. The philosophy behind
the development of the continuum of force was best expressed by
Captain Anthony Tangeman, Chief Coast Guard Office of Law
Enforcement from 1995-2000 and project manager for the
development of this new capability, when he stated that "[olur
goal is to protect our people and stop [Go-Fast boats without
firing a shot, but if necessary be able to use force effectively and
safely." 7
Once it was demonstrated that the right combination of
weapons and techniques were capable of being used safely, in a
non-lethal manner from helicopters, the pilots and gunners
responsible for firing the weapons underwent extensive training
to ensure practical capability to employ the weapons, thorough
knowledge of Coast Guard use of force policy, and that the
individuals possessed the required judgment to assess potential
self-defense situations.48 The extensive training and testing
safety of noncombatants."
Id. at *4-5; R. Steele, A Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons (Jan. 5, 1998), available at
http:i/www.fas.orgman/dod.101/sys/landdocs/NONLETH.HTM (last modified Jan. 26,
1998).
46. Id. at *3. The Department of Defense has defined "non-lethal weapons" as
'weapon systems that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate
personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and
undesired damage to property and the environment." Defense Dep't Directive Number
3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, July 9, 1996." DOD policy also recognizes that it is
impossible to guarantee that no deaths would occur through the use of these tools stating
that "Inlon-lethal weapons shall not be required to have a zero probability of producing
fatalities or permanent injuries. However, while complete avoidance of these effects is not
guaranteed or expected, when properly employed, non-lethal weapons should significantly
reduce them as compared with physically destroying the same target." Id.
47. M. Emerson and A. Tangeman, End Game Success: Operation New Frontier,
FLIGHTLINES (forthcoming Fall/Winter 2000) (manuscript at 4, on file with author).
48. The Supreme Court has recognized the pivotal role of training. See Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992); County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 833 (1998). In these cases the Court highlighted the
importance of use of force training for law enforcement personnel, stating that law
enforcement agencies may be held liable for constitutional violations due to excessive
force that results from a deliberate failure to train law enforcement officers.
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performed by the Coast Guard prior to the initial deployment of
the capability to use force from helicopters, combined with a use
of force policy, which emphasizes the minimum force necessary,
gave the Coast Guard confidence that fielding this new capability
was in full compliance with the law of the United States.
IV. PART III: INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSIDERATIONS
There were two international law considerations at issue
during the development of the Coast Guard's capability to use
force from helicopters: the Coast Guard's authority to exercise
jurisdiction over a non-U.S. vessel, including the right to board
the vessel, and the authority to use force, if necessary, to compel
a vessel subject to Coast Guard jurisdiction to stop upon being
ordered to do so. 9 The Coast Guard's authority to issue a lawful
order to a non-U.S. vessel to stop and allow a boarding is based
upon the carefully crafted international law of the sea regime,
codified in two major treaties: the 1958 United Nations High
Seas Convention and the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea
Convention."
On the other hand, and unlike U.S. domestic law, the
international legal regime concerning the permissible use of force
in a law enforcement context against private actors is not well-
defined. Although the use of force for law enforcement purposes
is recognized in customary international law, almost no
international treaties deal with the issue, and it is not well-
defined in case law. However, the ability to use force when
needed to enforce international rights and compel compliance
with lawful orders of a State is essential to maintaining the
viability of the carefully crafted law of the sea regime.
A. Law of the Sea Regime: Flag State Jurisdiction
and the Right of Visit
The international maritime law regime is founded on the
principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction within international
49. Coast Guard authority over U.S. flag vessels is clear under domestic law and
international law as the flag State. 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1994); LOS Convention, art. 92, supra
note 30, at 1287.
50. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention]; LOS Convention, supra note 30.
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waters. This means that outside of waters where a coastal State
may exercise sovereignty, such as territorial seas, only the
country where a vessel is registered, the flag State, may exercise
jurisdiction.5 However, in cases where a vessel does not claim
protection of any flag state because it is either not registered in
any State or claims registry in more than one State, also termed
a stateless vessel, international law fills this legal vacuum by
authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction by any country over such
vessels."
The typical Go-Fast vessel suspected of transporting
narcotics or in some cases actually carrying bales of narcotics in
plain view displays no indicia of nationality, fails to fly a flag or
display a home port on the stern, nor makes a claim of a country
of registry when questioned. In these circumstances, exercise of
jurisdiction over that vessel based on assimilation to stateless
status would appear to be easily justified. However, because the
concept of flag State authority is so fundamental to the law of the
sea regime, international law provides a mechanism to allow
government officials to board vessels suspected of being stateless
in order to better determine whether a vessel is legitimately
registered in any country. This examination, termed "Right of
Visit," is embodied in Article 22 of the High Seas Convention and
Article 110 of the Law of the Seas Convention. Pursuant to this
right, a duly authorized government vessel or aircraft may send a
boarding team to examine the registry of a vessel when there is
reasonable grounds to suspect a vessel is engaged in piracy, the
51. High Seas Convention, art. 6, supra note 50, at 2315; LOS Convention, art. 92,
supra note 30, at 1287. A state has complete sovereignty over it's own territorial seas
subject to the right of innocent passage and therefore may exercise jurisdiction over
foreign-flag vessels for violations of its own laws in its territorial sea without flag State
consent. High Seas Convention, art. 1, supra, note 50, at 2314; LOS Convention, art. 2,
supra note 30, at 1272. A flag State may exercise its jurisdiction by authorizing a
different State to take specified law enforcement actions on its behalf. See, e.g., LOS
Convention, art. 108, supra note 30, at 1289 (stating any State which has reasonable
grounds for believing a vessel registered in that State is engaged in illicit traffic of
narcotic drugs "may request the cooperation of other States to suppress such traffic");
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic In Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, art. 17, 28 I.L.M. 497, 518 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see
also infra note 53.
52. LOS Convention, art. 92, supra note 30, at 1287; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW sec 522(2)(b), reporter's note 7 (1986). But see
CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 30, at 172. See also Rachel Canty, Limits of Coast
Guard Authority to Board Foreign Flag Vessels on the High Seas, 23 TUL. MAR. L.J. 123
(1998), for a more complete discussion of the law of the sea jurisdictional regime on the
high seas.
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slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, of being without
nationality, or though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its
flag, the vessel is, in reality, the same nationality as the
warship."
A Right of Visit boarding of a vessel suspected of being
stateless by the Coast Guard usually begins with an inspection
for documents, registration numbers, or similar evidence. If any
evidence of registry is found or a claim of nationality is made by
the master of the vessel, that evidence is forwarded to the
claimed flag State with a request to verify registry. However, if
there is no evidence or claim of registry, or if the claim is refuted
by the flag State, the vessel may be deemed stateless, and as
such any State may exercise jurisdiction over the vessel.5 4 In this
53. See Louis B. Sohn, Peacetime Use of Force on the High Seas, Comment, 64 INT'L
LAW STUDIES: THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 38, 38-59 (1991), for an in depth
discussion of the evolution of this concept. But see, D.P. O'CONNELL, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA II 802 (I.A. Shearer ed., 1982); MYRES S.
MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 886-893 (1987), for arguments
that the Right of Visit only applies during wartime. This right should not be confused
with the concept of "Visit and Search," which is often also referred to as a "Right of Visit"
under the Hague Convention. The concept of "Visit and Search" provides the basis for
belligerent warships or military aircraft to determine the character, enemy or neutral, of
merchant ships and their cargo. Hague Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Parties in Naval War, art. 2, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415. See
Commander's Handbook, supra note 30, at 7-23, for a general overview of the right of
"Visit and Search."
54. Interestingly, considering the importance placed on flag State jurisdiction, little
guidance is provided in either the High Seas Convention or the LOS Convention
regarding how to determine whether a vessel is truly stateless. These conventions
contain considerably greater, detailed guidance regarding how government officials may
exercise jurisdiction if a vessel is engaged in other activities for which a Right of Visit
boarding is allowed. LOS Convention, art. 99, 105-107, supra note 30, at 1288-1289
(slavery and piracy); High Seas Convention, art. 13-21, supra note 50, at 2316-2321
(slavery and piracy). Additionally, the LOS Convention contains similar guidance for
vessels engaged in unauthorized radio broadcasts. LOS Convention, art. 109, supra note
30, at 1289. The problem of unauthorized broadcasting arose between the drafting of the
High Seas Convention and the LOS Convention.
To fill in this gap, other international treaties have addressed the issue of determining
whether a vessel is stateless, most notably Article 17 of the Vienna Convention. Article
17 of the Vienna Convention provides a framework for confirming or refuting registry of a
vessel and requesting authorization from the flag State to take certain limited
enforcement actions. Article 17(2) of the Vienna Convention significantly expands the
rights of non-flag States encountering vessels suspected of engaging in illicit traffic from
Article 108 of the LOS Convention, which merely provides that States shall cooperate in
the suppression of narcotics trafficking. Article 17(2) provides not only that flag States
may request assistance from other States in suppressing the illicit traffic of narcotics, but
also that the same request may be made by States encountering vessels displaying no flag
or marks of registry suspected of illicit narcotics trafficking. Article 17(2) also requires
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scenario, a Right of Visit boarding by the Coast Guard often leads
to an assertion, in accordance with international law, of U.S.
jurisdiction over that vessel.5
Inherent in the right of States to conduct a Right of Visit
boarding is an obligation on the part of the vessel to allow the
boarding. However, in most cases, Go-Fast vessels detected by
the United States are hailed and ordered to stop with no
response. Generally, Go-Fasts blatantly ignore a valid order of
the United States to stop, few answering hails or taking any
action, such as stopping or slowing their vessels.5 Besides the
sheer frustration of watching suspected drugs traffickers operate
unimpeded, the inability of the Coast Guard to stop apparent
stateless Go-Fasts under circumstances where the United States
had a right to do so, seriously undermines the credibility of the
international and U.S. law of the sea enforcement regime.
B. Lack of Use of Force Guidance for Law Enforcement
Under International Law
In the international law context, there is minimal guidance
concerning the use of force for the enforcement of laws, whether
established by treaty, customary international law or domestic
law, or by clearly defined rights. Neither the High Seas
Convention nor the Law of the Sea Convention specifically
addresses acceptable levels of force to implement the rights and
that States so requested 'shall render such assistance within the means available to
them." Important provisions in the remainder of Article 17 set forth procedures for
confirming a registry claim and requesting authorization from the claimed flag State to
take measures against the suspect vessel, including boarding and searching of the vessel,
underscoring the need for expeditious responses to a request for registry and
authorization, encouraging States to enter into bilateral or regional agreements, and
specifically stating that actions under Article 17 "shall be carried out only by warships or
military aircraft" or other clearly marked government vessels or aircraft. Although not
specifically stated in Article 17, it is implied that if the suspect vessel is without a valid
flag State registry either because a claim is refuted by the alleged flag State or no claim is
made, the vessel is stateless, and therefore, under international law principles, any State
may exercise jurisdiction. See Vienna Convention, supra note 51, at 518-520.
55. U.S. courts have agreed that the United States has jurisdiction in such
circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147 (11th Cir. 1985).
Some statutes specifically provide for U.S. jurisdiction over stateless vessels. See, e.g.,
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c) (2000).
56. CG Drug Interdiction Division, supra note 20. Generally, the only Go-Fast
vessels that would stop upon being hailed by a U.S. government vessel were ones with
mechanical problems, often the result of prolonged transits at high speeds in an attempt
to outrun law enforcement assets.
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duties set forth in the agreements. 7 There is also no guidance
regarding the use of force in the principal international treaty
regarding international cooperation to suppress the trafficking of
narcotics, the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, also
called the Vienna Convention." Additionally, the primary
international convention governing air operations, the
Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, also referred
to as the Chicago Convention, does not prohibit the use of force
for law enforcement from aircraft directed at vessels in
international waters, as long as the operations are conducted
with due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft."
Coast Guard air assets are prohibited from using force against
other air assets except in self-defense. 0
The minimal guidance which exists under international law
regarding the use of force in a law enforcement context is very
broad. The only multi-lateral international treaty which
addresses the issue provides little detail. Article 22(f) of the
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
57. Despite the obvious need for duly authorized government ships to have the
capability to use force to enforce the international maritime legal regime, the LOS
Convention never specifically addresses the issue of what measures can be taken against
uncooperative vessels to enforce the legal regime the Convention establishes. It could be
argued that Article 110 of the LOS Convention obliquely acknowledges that force may be
used to stop a vessel subject to boarding since paragraph 3 of the article specifically
provides that if suspicions resulting in a boarding prove to be unfounded and the ship has
not committed any act justifying them, the ship should be compensated for any loss or
damage which may have been sustained. LOS Convention, art. 110, supra note 30, at
1289. Additionally, although the Vienna Convention requires states to "co-operate [sic] to
the fullest extent possible to suppress illicit traffic by sea, in conformity with the
international law of the sea," the convention fails to define what "suppression" may entail.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 51, at 518.
58. See supra note 54.
59. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. Although the Chicago Convention does
not apply to military aircraft, the Coast Guard considers the convention as binding on
Coast Guard operations except when military necessity or search and rescue operations
requires non-compliance. COAST GUARD AIR OPERATIONS MANUAL, COMDTINST
M3710.1D. Under the Chicago Convention, however, military flight operations still must
be conducted in accordance with "due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft."
Chicago Convention, art. 3(d).
While Article 3 of the Chicago Convention, which codifies the customary international
law principle prohibiting the use of weapons against civil aircraft, generally prohibits
using force against civil aircraft in flight, the Coast Guard's airborne use of force
capability does not use force against aircraft; rather it merely provides a new platform for
the delivery of force against suspect vessels.
60. MLEM, supra note 4, at 4-4.
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United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
commonly referred to as the "Straddling Stocks Convention,"
provides that inspecting States shall ensure that duly authorized
inspectors "avoid the use of force except when and to the degree
necessary to ensure the safety of the inspectors and where the
inspectors are obstructed in the execution of their duties. The
degree of force used shall not exceed that reasonably required
under the circumstances."' By contrast, the use of force to stop
non-compliant vessels is specifically authorized in eighteen
bilateral maritime drug interdiction agreements between the
United States and other States in South America, Central
America, and the Caribbean.2
The broad language of the Straddling Stocks Convention is
generally reflective of the few decisions of international courts
where the use of force was an issue. A 1999 decision by the Law
of the Sea Tribunal described customary international law as
requiring that "the use of force must be avoided as far as possible
and, where force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is
reasonable and necessary in the circumstances." ' The decision
went on to describe the normal practice for stopping vessels at
sea for law enforcement purposes, a process which reflects U.S.
61. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for
signature Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542, 1566. Interestingly, it is U.S. policy, as reflected
in Coast Guard policy, to generally not use force in pure fishery cases. MLEM, supra note
4, at 4-8. This policy serves as a positive example in the international community,
particularly with respect to a number of States who have used inappropriate force in
fishery cases, such as firing into the pilothouse of a vessel. Additionally, it relieves public
concern regarding the use of force only to protect fishery resources and recognizes that
force has not historically been necessary to enforce fishery laws.
62. The agreements generally authorize the use of force to compel compliance,
including warning shots and disabling fire, in conformance with the domestic law of the
State employing the force. See UNITED STATES TREATY INDEX 555-56 (Igor I. Karess
ed., 1998). These include agreements with Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Netherlands
Antilles, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent/Grenadines, Trinidad and
Tobago and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., Agreement Between The Government Of The
United States Of America And The Government Of Antigua And Barbuda Concerning
Maritime Counter-Drug Operations, June 3, 1996, Hein's No. KAV 4625, Temp. State
Dep't No. 96-116, at 2-3.
63. The MV Saiga (No.2) (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), 1999
available at LOS Tribunal Website, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 12, 2000).
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Coast Guard standard practice:
[fiirst to give an auditory or visual signal to stop, using
internationally recognized signals. Where this does not
succeed, a variety of actions may be taken, including
firing shots across the bows of the ship. It is only after
the appropriate actions fail that the pursuing vessels
may, as a last resort, use force. Even then, appropriate
warnings must be issued to the ship and all efforts
should be made to ensure that life is not endangered."
The Tribunal found that the use of force in the instant case
was excessive since the officials using force fired at the vessel
without any warning, and fired "indiscriminately" once on board
the vessel despite no signs of resistance from the crew."
C. The Importance of the Use of Force to Maintaining
the Law of the Sea Regime
Although there is little guidance under international law
regarding the use of force to compel compliance, the ability to use
force when necessary is fundamental to maintaining a stable and
viable law of the sea regime. This ability is even more critical
when dealing with actors, such as stateless vessels, which are
outside the normal bounds of the legal regime. The existence of a
State's right to take specified actions against a private actor,
such as the authority to conduct a Right of Visit boarding, is
meaningless without a viable means of enforcement.
The international law regime is generally viewed as
outlining norms of acceptable behavior between States, and not
as concerned with the acts of private individuals." As a result,
64. Id. at *44 (citing I'm Alone (Can. V. U.S.), 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1609
(1935) and The Red Crusader (Denmark v. U.KL), 35 I.L.R. 485, 499 (Commission of
Enquiry 1962).
65. Id. The use of force against the rm Alone and the Red Crusader were also found
to be excessive as the officials using the force did not exhaust all other available means of
stopping the vessels. Red Crusader, 35 I.L.R. at 499; I'm Alone, 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb.
Awards at 1615. The Commission in the Im Alone case noted, however, that if the force
used was "necessary and reasonable" for the purpose, the pursuing vessel would not be
liable if an incidental sinking of the suspect vessel occurred. I'm Alone, 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l
Arb. Awards at 1615. See Canney, supra note 3, for a detailed account of the events
surrounding the seizure of the I'm Alone.
66. Most definitions of international law reflect this view. International law has
20001
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
international law does not provide guidance regarding traditional
"police powers" aimed at punishing private individual violators,
but instead focuses on the actions of States.87 There are a variety
of generally recognized inducements besides traditional police
authority which significantly affect State actions. Such
inducements include concepts such as "enlightened self interest,"
which is the risk of losing on a single issue as offset by the
benefit of living in a world society with a known set of rules for
peaceable settlement of disputes among States, necessity to
predict behavior of nations in decision making, credibility among
other "peer" States, habit among decision makers to rely on such
norms, world opinion, social acceptance, and the possibility of
negative reactions.8
These "inducements," with the exception of possible negative
consequences, have little or no affect on private actors. A study
sponsored by the National Institute of Justice confirmed that the
primary means of discouraging illicit behavior is the certainty of
punishment.8  That is, as the certainty and severity of
punishment increases, the probability that an individual will
commit the crime in question decreases." The extraordinary
jurisdictional exception which allows any State to exert
jurisdiction over a stateless vessel on the high seas arose
precisely to deal with the potential consequences of allowing the
unhampered operation of stateless vessels on the high seas not
operating within the boundaries of established international law.
Therefore, stateless vessels are not influenced by the normal
inducements which lead States to voluntarily comply with
international law. The entire law of the sea regime, with its
fundamental reliance on flag State responsibilities, falls apart if
there is no viable enforcement mechanism against stateless
vessels. The recognition of the potential impact unimpeded
been defined as a body of principles, customs, and rules which is recognized as effectively
binding obligations by sovereign states and any other such entities that have been
granted international status. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 3
(1981). "International law consists of a body of rules governing the relationship between
states." G.H. HACKWORTH, 1 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, (1944).
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELTAIONS LAW § 102
(1987).
68. VON GLAHN, supra note 66, at 6-7.
69. J.L. Miller & A.B. Anderson, Updating the Deterrence Doctrine, 77 J.CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 418 (1986).
70. Id. This study supports the conclusions of the 1989 study of deterrence in the
drug smuggling context discussed supra.
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stateless vessels could have on the carefully crafted law of the
sea regime is what ultimately led the drafters of the Law of the
Sea Convention to include suspicion of being stateless as
permissible grounds for a Right of Visit boarding.7 The U.S.
Commentary on the Law of the Sea Convention makes clear the
high value the United States places on this right:
WARSHIP'S RIGHT OF APPROACH AND VISIT (ARTICLE
110): Article 110 of the Convention reaffirms the right of
warships, military aircraft or other duly authorized ships or
aircraft to approach and visit other vessels to ensure that they
are not engaged in various illegal activities. This is a right of
great importance to the United States. Article 110 permits the
right of visit to be exercised if there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that a foreign flag vessel is engaged in piracy, the
slave trade, or unauthorized broadcasting; is without nationality;
or is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. The
maintenance and continued respect for these rights are essential
to maritime counternarcotics and alien smugaling interdiction
operations.72
Traditional methods of enforcement under the international
law regime are not viable in the context of stateless vessels.
These mechanisms generally consist of a range of diplomatic and
judicial actions and include diplomatic protests; third party
mediation, including referral to a specialized tribunal or panel of
experts and referral to an international court; or action, such as
sanctions, by the United Nations or any other universal or
regional agency.73 Many of these mechanisms anticipate a State
against whom a protest can be lodged or a claim can be filed. In
the case of a stateless vessel, there is no State against whom
such action can be taken. Unless the vessel and persons on board
ultimately end up in the hands of some government, such as
voluntarily stopping or becoming disabled, there is virtually no
chance of determining the identity or nationality of any persons
involved in the criminal activity. Additionally, some scholars
have argued that the fundamental right of freedom of navigation
71. Sohn, supra note 53, at 59.
72. Message From The President Of The United States And Commentary
Accompanying The United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea And The
Agreement Relating To The Implementation Of The Part XI Upon Their Transmittal To
The United States Senate For Its Advice And Consent, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 77,
119 (1994)(emphasis added).
73. VAN GLAHN, supra note 66, at 8.
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on the high seas under the law of the sea regime is solely
applicable to vessels legitimately registered in a State, and
therefore, stateless vessels do not enjoy this freedom under
international law.7" Accordingly, the use of force to compel a
vessel to stop and submit to a Right of Visit boarding, or any
other exertion of authority over a stateless vessel, is an essential
component of maintaining a viable law of the sea regime.
V. CONCLUSION
During the later half of 1999 and early 2000, the Coast
Guard successfully deployed armed helicopters on three
occasions, targeting smugglers using Go-Fasts to transport
narcotics in the Caribbean. During those initial deployments,
the armed helicopters were involved in six cases involving Go-
Fast vessels, using disabling fire from helicopters on two
occasions to stop a suspect vessel.75 As a result of those six
interdictions, the Coast Guard seized six vessels, 11,710 pounds
of marijuana, 4,475 pounds of cocaine, and arrested twenty
individuals.'6 Commander Mike Emerson, Chief of the Drug
Interdiction Division in the Coast Guard's Office of Law
Enforcement during the time the capability was developed and
first deployed, summed up the results succinctly: "We're
obviously pleased with the results. These new capabilities give
us a credibility to conduct law enforcement that we haven't had
before."77 Based on the success of the initial deployments, the
Coast Guard is establishing a permanent squadron of specially
equipped helicopters and specially trained pilots devoted full
time to this mission area."
Prior to the initial deployment, Coast Guard officials
engaged in extensive outreach with key components of the U.S.
government, including members of Congress and other federal
agencies and departments. Critical to the decision to go forward
74. See LOS Convention, art. 87, 90, supra note 30, at 1286-1287 (Article 87 states
that the "high seas are open to all States," and Article 90 states that "[elvery State... has
the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas.")(emphasis added).
75. Disabling fire employed from new Coast Guard fast boats was employed to stop
two of the Go-Fasts as well.
76. U.S. Coast Guard, 7.5 Tons of Narcotics Netted by New Coast Guard Tactics
(Mar. 15, 2000), available at httpJ/www.uscg.mil/news/cegnews.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2000).
77. Nowhere to Run, Out of Time, COAST GUARD, May 2000, at 9-11.
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with the deployment of the use of force from helicopters was the
acquiescence from both the Department of State and the
Department of Justice. Coast Guard representatives had to
convince the Attorney General, among others, that this new
capability would employ weapons in a proficient and precise
manner with limited risk to suspects. Moreover, had the
Attorney General not expressed her confidence in the Coast
Guard's initiative, the project would have been terminated.
The Coast Guard's new capability to use force from
helicopters in order to compel compliance with a lawful order is
not only legal, but also serves to strengthen the law of the sea
regime by providing an effective tool for the enforcement of a
right recognized by international law. The establishment of
these rights by international instruments, such as the Law of the
Seas Convention, and by customary international law are soon
eroded if there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure
compliance with lawful actions of any State. By carefully
developing a new force capability and a well thought out
application of that force, the Coast Guard is ensuring the
viability of the law of the sea regime in the future.
79. The author was a member of many of the outreach briefings, including a briefing
to key members within the Department of Justice.
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